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WHOSE BENEFICIARIES ARE THEY ANYWAY? COPENHAVER
V. ROGERS AND THE ATTORNEY'S CONTRACT TO PREPARE A
WILL IN VIRGINIA
I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE
In a case of first impression in the Commonwealth, the Supreme Court
of Virginia recently considered whether an attorney may be liable for
drafting a will which results in the failure of a testamentary gift to in-
tended beneficiaries. Historically, will beneficiaries had been denied a
means of recovery against attorneys due to a lack of privity between the
parties.1 Although Virginia remains a "strict privity' 2 jurisdiction, it rec-
ognizes third-party contract beneficiary claims' and has legislatively abro-
gated the privity requirement in other areas of the law.4 The plaintiffs in
Copenhaver v. Rogers" sought to establish a third-party beneficiary claim
as the intended beneficiaries of the contract between the deceased testa-
tor-client and the drafting attorney. The court implicitly recognized the
potential viability of such a claim, yet concluded that the requisite cause
of action had not been stated.' The court further surmised that under
current Virginia law it would "no doubt be difficult for a litigant, in the
case of this kind, to meet the requirements of third-party beneficiary
claims."7
As the first Virginia case on point, Copenhaver appears to accept, al-
beit somewhat reluctantly, a theoretical basis for legal malpractice actions
by intended beneficiaries of a contract to write a will. Copenhaver is sig-
nificant precedent in the Commonwealth and may open the door for
others to advance claims against attorneys for the negligent drafting of
wills." However, Copenhaver does expose the need to devise an equitable
1. See infra notes 9-28 and accompanying text.
2. See Copenhaver v. Rogers, 238 Va. 361, 366, 384 S.E.2d 593, 597 (1989); Ayyildiz v.
Kidd, 220 Va. 1080, 1085-86, 266 S.E.2d 108, 112-13 (1980). But see infra note 23 (discuss-
ing why Ayyildiz ought not be controlling precedent in wills cases).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-22 (Repl. Vol. 1986); see infra note 60.
4. Virginia has abolished the privity requirement in actions involving claims for damages
to persons or property. See infra note 61.
5. 238 Va. 361, 384 S.E.2d 593 (1989).
6. Id. at 371, 384 S.E.2d at 597-98.
7. Id. at 371, 384 S.E.2d at 598.
8. Cognizant of the malpractice crisis that exists in the legal community, this Note does
not advocate a sweeping extension of attorney liability to non-clients. Non-client claims
against lawyers have not developed heedlessly, but rather limited exceptions have evolved
for those innocent parties that suffer the brunt of attorney negligence or incompetence. In-
deed, the first case in this country to extend attorney liability to non-client beneficiaries of a
will spoke to the issue of whether the legal profession would be unduly burdened. That
court concluded that no such burden would be created, as the beneficiary in effect, is merely
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solution to the problems ingrained in the traditional recovery theories
which are fatal to these types of cases.
This Note will briefly examine the various approaches to non-client le-
gal malpractice actions taken by other jurisdictions beginning with a his-
torical account of the development of these actions. A discussion of
Copenhaver and of the third-party beneficiary claim as it pertains to con-
tracts to write wills and trusts in Virginia follows. This Note then advo-
cates the adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts position on
third party beneficiary contracts when dealing-with actions against law-
yers by would-be beneficiaries.
II. THE HISTORY OF THIRD-PARTY LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
In order to bring a professional'neglignce claim against an attorney,
the English common law required. that the parties be in privity.' Al-
though officially adopted as a rule of law in this country in 1879 in Sav-
ings Bank v. Ward,'0 the privity requirement had been assumed in Vir-
ginia nearly a century earlier. -
Deciding Stephens v. White1' in 1796, the Supreme Court of Virginia
was the first American appellate court to consider a legal malpractice ac-
tion. " In Stephens, the plaintiff claimed that his attorney failed to file a
necessary pleading. The attorney defended this' claim by stating that he
had not been paid for his services. The court found that the attorney was
liable for negligence because consideration was not necessary for a duty to
arise under the attorney-client relatib'nship'V- This rationale is still valid
today.14 Thus, although the privity requirement is contractual in nature,1
5
permitted to stand in the shoes of the client-testator, fortuitously silenced by death. See
Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal.2d 583, -, 364 P.2d 685, 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 825 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). It is hoped that the views expressed in this Note will help to
curtail legal malpractice by exposing to the bar the potential attorney liability that lies
within all wills.
An examination of all of the possible bases of liability for the estate planner is beyond the
scope of this Note. For discussion of those areas, see generally G. Johnston, Legal Malprac-
tice in Estate Planning - Perilous Times Ahead for the Practitioner, 67 IOWA L. REV. 629
(1982).
9. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (EX. 1842); see W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R.
KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON ToRTs 668 (5th ed. 1984).
10. 100 U.S. 195 (1879). The adoption of the strict privity rule was not without qualifica-
tions, however. Exceptions would be made if the allegations against an attorney were based
on fraud, collusion or if "the act is one imminently dangerous to the lives of others, or is an
act performed in pursuance of some legal duty." Id. at 205-06.
11. 2 Va. (1 Wash.) 203 (1796).
12. J.R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice: A Survey of the Virginia Law, VA. B. NEWS 19, 19-
20 (Apr. 1977); see Note, Legal Malpractice in Virginia: Tort or Contract? 16 U. RICH. L.
REV. 907, 907 (1982).
13. Stephens, 2 Va. (1 Wash.) at 211-12.
14. See D. MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE 2 (1980). "The at-
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it is clear that all of the technical elements of contract formation need
not be present; as used throughout this Note, "privity" may be broadly
defined as that relationship which results from the lawyer's representa-
tion of his client.
Whereas the privity requirement had slowly begun to erode in ofier
areas of the law,1" it remained an absolute defense to all third-party legal
malpractice claims until the early 1960's. The first step in disposing of the
privity defense in this context was taken by the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia in Lucas v. Hamm.17 The attorney in Lucas prepared a will which
contained a provision establishing a testamentary trust. The duration of
the trust violated the Rule Against Perpetuities, s rendering the trust
void. The intended beneficiaries of the failed trust sued the drafting at-
torney. Under the strict privity rule, the only person who could have had
torney-client relationship is said to be contractual in nature .... Whether the attorney re-
ceived or was to receive compensation is immaterial to the determination of whether an
attorney-client relationship existed." Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Guy v. Liederbach,
501 Pa. 47, -, 459 A.2d 744, 749 (1983)(fee not "indispensable" in creating an attorney-
client relationship).
15. D. MEISELMAN, supra note 14, at 2; see, e.g., Annotation, Attorney's Liability to One
Other Than Immediate Client For Negligence In Connection With Legal Duties, 61 A.L.R.
4th 615 (1988).
16. The landmark decision that dismissed the privity requiren~ent in products liability
cases is MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). After Mac-
Pherson, "the privity requirement began to assume less importance in one area of the law
after another." Schwartz v. Greenfield, Stein & Weisinger, 90 Misc. 2d 882, -, 396
N.Y.S.2d 582, 583 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
17. 56 Cal.2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1962).
18. Calling the Rule Against Perpetuities a "technicality-ridden legal nightmare," 56 Cal.
2d at -, 364 P.2d at 690, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 826 (quoting Leach, Perpetuities Legislation
Massachusetts Style, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1349, 1349 (1954)), the Lucas court decided "it
would not be proper to hold that the defendant failed to use such skill, prudence, and dili-
gence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly exercise." Id.
In Virginia, attorneys owe clients a duty to carry out the client's matters with "a reasona-
ble degree of care, skill and dispatch .... " Glenn v. Haynes, 192 Va. 574, 581, 66 S.E.2d
509, 512 (1951); see Note, supra note 12, at 907-08.
Canon 6 of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
DR 6-101 Competence and Promptness.
(A) A lawyer shall undertake representation only in matters in which:
(1) The lawyer can act with competence and demonstrate the specific legal knowl-
edge, skill, efficiency, and thoroughness in preparation employed in acceptable prac-
tice by lawyers undertaking similar matters . ..
VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 (1983).
Judge Poff was more demanding of the degree of skill required in the legal profession. In
a legal malpractice action, "courts have a responsibility to the client, to the profession, and
to the public at large to make and enforce rules which promote excellence in the practice of
the law and energize the distinctive rights and obligations of the lawyer-client relationship."
Allied Prod., Inc. v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763, 767, 232 S.E.2d 774, 777 (1977) (Poff, J.,
dissenting).
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standing to sue was the now deceased testator-client."9 The court recog-
nized that upholding the privity defense was tantamount to sanctioning
attorney unaccountability, and found that significant public policy con-
siderations" outweighed its retention. The modern trend that stems from
this balancing test has been to allow limited exceptions21 that relax the
privity requirement in non-client suits.22
In the nearly thirty years since Lucas, courts have been split as to the
propriety of the privity requirement in non-client legal malpractice cases.
While the majority of jurisdictions appear to uphold the privity defense,23
an ascending minority of courts reach conclusions to the contrary.24 In
the jurisdictions where such claims have been permitted, limited excep-
tions to the privity requirement have been granted to allow actions in
19. See Lucas, 56 Cal. 2d at -, 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824. "[I]f persons such
as plaintiffs are not permitted to recover for the loss resulting from negligence of the drafts-
man, no one would be able to do so, and the policy of preventing future harm would be
impaired." Id. at -, 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
20. Id. at -, 364 P.2d at 687-89, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 823-25; see infra notes 29-35 and ac-
companying text.
21. Privity is not wholly cast away, rather, courts are willing to make closely tailored,
limited exceptions to the rule. See Walker v. Lawson, 514 N.E.2d 629, 634 (Ind. Ct. App.
1987), vacated, 526 N.E.2d 968 (Ind. 1988); Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, __, 492
A.2d 618, 624 (1985) (third-party beneficiary theory).
22. See Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Iowa 1987).
23. See D. MEISELMAN, supra note 14, at 105; Annotation, supra note 15, at 625; see also
Lilyhorn v. Dier, 214 Neb. 728, 335 N.W.2d 554 (1983); Spivey v. Pulley, 138 A.D.2d 563,
526 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1988); Victor v. Goldman, 74 Misc. 2d 685, 344 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1973), afl'd,
43 A.D.2d 1021, 351 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1974); Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74, 512
N.E.2d 636 (1987); Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, -, 459 A.2d 744, 749-50 (1983) (recog-
nizing "overwhelming majority" privity rule).
Relying upon annotations and commentators, some courts have stated that a strict
privity requirement is a majority rule. Such comments may reflect the holdings and
dictum of the majority of the decisions under particular facts, but do not accurately
characterize the state of the law in the United States.
The vast majority of such decisions concern factual situations where no jurisdiction
would permit the plaintiff to bring a suit for negligence. Many reported decisions
concern claims of opponents in litigation, yet no jurisdiction has found a duty by an
attorney to an adverse party. . . . One way to measure the strength of the privity
rule is to examine those decisions concerning claims by a would-be beneficiary of a
will.
R. MALLEN & V. LEvIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 153-54 (2d ed. 1981) (footnotes omitted).
There is precedent in Virginia that an attorney's liability is generally only to the client.
Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080, 1085, 266 S.E.2d 108, 112 (1980). It should be noted that
Ayyildiz was a malicious prosecution case brought by an adverse party in the underlying
medical malpractice action. It is submitted that Ayyildiz ought not be considered as author-
ity in actions concerning the intended beneficiaries of wills and trusts.
24. D. MEISELMAN, supra note 14 at 105; see Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St. 3d 74, -'
512 N.E.2d 636, 639 (1987) (Brown, J., dissenting) (majority of courts); see, e.g., Stowe v.
Smith, 184 Conn. 194, 441 A.2d 81 (1981); Olge v. Fuiten, 102 Ill. 2d 356, 466 N.E.2d 224
(1984); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 670 (Iowa 1987); Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md.
115, 492 A.2d 618 (1985); Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983).
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tort,25 third-party contract beneficiary theories, 2 and public policy con-
siderations.2 7 Consistent with their frequent overlap in application, an ex-
amination of these theories may show that they are all pieces of one con-
cept- the need to provide an equitable, common sense solution to the
plight of the intended beneficiary of a will, damaged by legal
malpractice.28
III. THE APPLICABLE THEORIES OF RECOVERY
A. The Balance of Factors Test
Several courts have allowed would-be beneficiaries a cause of action as
a matter of sound public policy in order to meet the goals of providing a
recovery to innocent parties and of discouraging the recurrence of such
harm.29 In balancing the factors presented by these cases, courts consider
the following:
1) The extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff,
2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff,
3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury,
4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and
the injury, and
5) the prevention of future harm."
25. E.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961) cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 987 (1962); Herman v. Frey, 537 N.E.2d 529 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); see D.
MEISELMAN, supra note 14, at 216-18.
26. E.g., Stowe v. Smith, 184 Conn. 194, 441 A.2d 81 (1981); Olge v. Fuiten, 12 Ill. App. 3d
1048, 445 N.E.2d 1344 (1983); Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 115, 492 A.2d 618 (1985); Guy
v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983).
27. E.g., Fickett v. Superior Court, 27 Ariz. App. 793, 558 P.2d 988 (1976); Heyer v. Flaig,
70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969); Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060
(D.C. 1983).
28. See Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. at -, 459 A.2d at 753 (Nix, J., concurring). "It would
be unconscionable to permit admitted actionable conduct to be insulated by the fortuitous
death of the person recognized in the law to have standing to prosecute such a claim, where
the brunt of the injury from such conduct is borne by a living party." Id.
29. See supra note 27.
30. Lucas, 56 Cal. 2d at -, 364 P.2d at 687-88, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 823-24. The Supreme
Court of California adopted this test from a case it had earlier considered which involved a
notary public's liability to beneficiaries for the negligent drafting of a will. See Biakanja v.
Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
The Lucas court omitted a sixth factor from the Biakanja test without explanation: the
amount of moral blame to be attached to the defendant's actions. It is submitted that the
Lucas court took the better view in deleting that element because moral blame does not fit
with the notion of an unintentional, negligent act. Even highly competent, experienced
members of the bar may be subject to the occasional error in draftsmanship.
Moral blame ought not enter into the equation, but lawyers should not be litigation proof
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The balance of factors rationale has been the basis for finding that a
duty of care existed between the attorney and the beneficiaries, 31 thus
relaxing the strict privity requirement on the basis of policy. Alterna-
tively, the same balance of factors test is used by courts to support the
third-party beneficiary analysis, finding that policy considerations and
the reality of the estate planning scheme 2 dictate that beneficiaries were
clearly intended to benefit from a contract to write a will.33 Although
state courts are entrusted with furthering the public interest in providing
actionable legal malpractice claims, 4 especially where the opposite result
would render the attorney unaccountable to anyone, 5 the balance of fac-
tors test has been criticized as being overly broad and has not been gener-
ally accepted.36
B. The Tort Theory
An attorney-client relationship impresses a duty upon the lawyer to
handle the client's affairs in a competent manner. The attorney-client re-
when innocent beneficiaries are damaged through legal malpractice. "Lawyers, like other
mortals, are liable for failure to exercise ordinary care, skill, and diligence." Walker v. Law-
son, 514 N.E.2d 629, 631 (Ind. 1987) vacated, 526 N.E.2d 968 (Ind. 1988).
For a discussion of the theoretical origins underlying each element and an argument advo-
cating the acceptance of the balance of factors test, see Note, Legal Malpractice for the
Negligent Drafting of a Testamentary Instrument: Schreiner v. Scoville, 73 IOWA L. REv.
1231, 1250 (1988).
31. Wisdom v. Neal, 568 F. Supp. 4, 7-9 (D.N.M. 1982).
32. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
33. Compare Lucas, 56 Cal. 2d at -, 364 P.2d at 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 825 (policy sup-
ports both tort and third-party beneficiary theories) with Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, -,
449 P.2d 161, 167, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225, 231 (1969)(third-party beneficiary theory is
superfluous).
34. See Allied Prod., Inc. v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763, 767, 232 S.E.2d 774, 776-77 (1977)
(Poff, J., dissenting).
[A] legal malpractice case involves standards, societal values, and public policies with
infinitely broader impact. In unique ways, the quality of the practice of the legal
profession affects the welfare of the body politic .... [C]ourts have a responsibility
to the client, to the profession, and to the public at large to make and to enforce rules
which promote excellence in the practice of the law and energize the distinctive rights
and obligations of the lawyer-client relationship.
Id.
35. See Lucas, 56 Cal. 2d at -, 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824; Heyer v. Flaig, 70
Cal. 2d at 228, 449 P.2d at 165, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 229 (executor has no standing). The benefi-
ciary is the only person who might be able to bring an action against the allegedly negligent
lawyer. Even if the executor had standing, since the estate is not damaged by a failed dispo-
sition (the asset is still within the estate), the fact that the "estate has nothing to gain would
remove any incentive for suit." Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, -, 459 A.2d 744, 749 (1983).
36. See Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md.-116, -, 492 A.2d 618, 622 (1985). The balance of
factors test has been considered too broad, unworkable, and conducive to inconsistent re-
sults. See id. and cases cited therein; Essex v. Ryan, 446 N.E.2d 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983);
Hale v. Groce, 304 Or. 281, 744 P.2d 1289 (1987).
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lationship, breach of the duty of care, damages, and proximate cause form
the basis of the standard legal malpractice claim grounded in
negligence.3 7
Recognizing that the damages from estate planning errors are inflicted
upon the beneficiaries, not the deceased client or the estate itself,"8 and
that these damages are foreseeable, some courts have broadened the law-
yer's duty of care beyond the zone of strict privity to those actually
harmed.' The lawyer breaches that extended duty owed to the benefi-
ciaries in failing to effectuate a valid testamentary disposition. The tort
recovery may be the sole basis of liability, 0 or it may run concurrently
with a third-party beneficiary theory,'4 1 or still a hybrid of the two.
4 2
While both theories may be pled in the alternative,'43 "the better reasoned
view . . . in . . .an action for the negligence of an attorney in the per-
formance of professional services [in Virginia], while sounding in tort, is
an action for breach of contract. .. .
37. See Byrd v. Martin, Hopkins, Lemon & Carter, P.C., 564 F. Supp. 1425, 1427 (W.D.
Va. 1983) (construing the prima facie case for legal malpractice under Virginia law), aft'd,
740 F.2d 961 (4th Cir. 1984).
38. See supra note 35.
39. See Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1987); Hale v. Groce, 83 Or. App.
at -, 730 P.2d at 577; Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d at -, 449 P.2d at 167, 74 Cal. Rptr. at
231.
Persuaded by a modification on the Lucas balance of factors test, the court in Schreiner
v. Scoville extended the attorney's duty of care to "the direct, intended, and specifically
identifiable beneficiaries of the testator as expressed in the testator's testamentary instru-
ments." Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d at 682. While commending the Schreiner court for
holding as it did in this case of first impression in Iowa, one commentator has argued that
the more flexible Lucas approach would better achieve increased attorney liability in estate
planning matters. See Note, supra note 30, at 1254.
40. Calling the third-party beneficiary theory a "conceptual superfluity" the court in
Heyer v. Flaig reasoned "the right of action sounds in tort and enures by reason of our
determination that public policy requires the recognition of a duty of care on the part of the
attorney which accrues directly to the third-party, the intended beneficiary." Heyer v. Flaig,
70 Cal. 2d at -, 449 P.2d at 167, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 231 (1969); see Needham v. Hamilton,
459 A.2d 1060, 1061 (D.C. 1983) (gravamen of the cause of action is in negligence), aff'd, 519
A.2d 172 (D.C. App. 1986). But see Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, -, 459 ANid 744, 752
(1983) (tort analysis is based on a "common confusion" of negligence principles; although a
breach of duty of care, liability restricted under contract rights).
41. Garcia v. Borelli, 129 Cal. App. 3d 24, 180 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1982); Olge v. Fuiten, 112
Ill. App. 3d 1048, 445 N.E.2d 1344 (1983).
42. Although pleading a third-party beneficiary claim, the court in Hale v. Groce decided
that the contract between the lawyer and the testator "merely incorporate[d] by reference
or by implication a general standard of skill and care to which the defendant would be
bound independent of the contract." Hale v. Groce, 83 Or. App. 55, 58, 730 P.2d 576, 578
(1986).
43. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-272 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
44. Oleyar v. Kerr, 217 Va. 88, 90, 225 S.E.2d 398, 400 (1976); see Note, supra note 12, at
907.
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C. The Third-Party Beneficiary Theory
When the parties to a contract intend that another shall receive all or
part of the benefit of the performance, an enforceable interest accrues in
the third party.45 In the estate planning context, the traditional applica-
tion of this theory casts the attorney in the role of the promisor, agreeing
to confer the benefits of the contract to write a will upon those persons
the client, as promisee, so designates. In exchange for this agreement, the
attorney is paid consideration in the form of a fee. In sum, "the will is not
the contract, but that which is contracted for. '46
It is submitted that this traditional application of the third-party bene-
ficiary doctrine does not realistically fit the estate planning scheme.
Courts that have implemented the third-party beneficiary recovery for
the drafting of testamentary instruments have admitted that it is the tes-
tator's intent as promisee which establishes the right of action.4"
In Virginia, a plaintiff must allege and show that "the parties to the
contract clearly and definitely intended it to confer a benefit upon him."4
Virginia has long recognized that persons upon whom the parties to a
contract intend to confer benefits may hold an actionable interest in see-
ing that the contract is performed.49 In addition to being a strict privity
jurisdiction,50 Virginia strictly adheres to the traditional third-party ben-
eficiary theory as well, as evidenced in Copenhaver.
IV. COPENHAVER v. ROGERS
In November of 1982, Mr. and Mrs. Wythe M. Hull, Jr., employed Mr.
Frank W. Rogers to "prepare and draft wills for the Hulls, evaluate the
Hulls' assets, and take steps to minimize any 'transfer taxes'."' 51 Mutual
45. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 712-34 (1982); Corbin, Contracts for the
Benefit of Third Persons, 46 LAW. Q. REV. 12 (1930). The elements of a third-party benefi-
ciary claim are the existence of a contract in which the promisor intended to benefit the
third-party, breach of that promise, and the resulting damages. Olge v. Fuiten, 112 Ill. App.
3d 1048, -, 445 N.E.2d 1344, 1347 (1983).
46. Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, -, 459 A.2d 744, 747, 751 (1983); see Copenhaver v.
Rogers, 238 Va. 361, 369-70, 384 S.E.2d 593, 597 (1989) (quoting Stowe v. Smith, 184 Conn.
194, 196, 441 A.2d 81, 82 (1981)).
47. E.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, -, 364 P.2d 685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 825
(1961), cert.denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Stowe v. Smith, 184 Conn. 194, -, 441 A.2d 81, 83
n.1 (1981); Hale v. Groce, 304 Or. 281, -, 744 P.2d 1289, 1291 (1987); Guy v. Liederbach,
501 Pa. 47, -, 459 A.2d 744, 750-52 (1983); see infra, notes 72-86 and accompanying text.
48. Allen v. Lindstrom, 237 Va. 489, 500, 379 S.E.2d 450, 457 (1989); Professional Realty
Corp. v. Bender, 216 Va. 737, 739, 222 S.E.2d 810, 812 (1976).
49. E.g., Montague Mfg. Co. v. Homes Corp., 142 Va. 301, 128 S.E. 447 (1925); see 33 VA.
CODE, ch. 116, § 2 (1849).
50. See supra note 2.
51. Copenhaver v. Rogers, 238 Va. 361, 361, 384 S.E.2d 593, 593 (1989).
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wills were prepared and executed with, inter alia, identical provisions for
the creation of a testamentary trust which would benefit the Hulls' two
daughters with a remainder in their issue.52
Shortly after Mrs. Hull's death in November of 1984, Rogers realized
that neither of the wills contained the necessary trust terms . 5 To rectify
the omission in Mr. Hull's will, Rogers drafted a codicil supplying the
missing trust terms. The codicil was executed on the same day that Mrs.
Hull's will was offered for probate.5 4
Rogers then wrote to the Hull's two daughters5 5 expressing the opinion
that the terms supplied in another provision to set up a different trust in
Mrs. Hull's will would save the defective trust. Rogers added that he
would file a petition on behalf of the Dominion Trust Company, executor
and trustee, to adopt his construction and uphold the trust. However, the
petition as filed asked the court to declare the trust void as it lacked the
needed trust terms. The court declared the trust invalid on those
grounds."" The interest that was to be held in trust passed outright to the
Hulls' daughters, Ellen H. Keever and Martha H. Copenhaver. Because
the trust failed, both daughters' issue lost their remainder interest.
57
Complaining of their lost remainder interest, Martha Copenhaver's issue
sued Rogers and his firm. The Copenhavers proceeded on a third-party
beneficiary theory.55 Alleging to be the intended beneficiaries of an oral
contract59 between the testator and Rogers, they relied upon the Virginia
third-party beneficiary statute, section 55-22 of the Code of Virginia.
Under section 55-22, a third party may enforce a "covenant or promise"
52. The trust corpus was to be "in equal shares or in trust as hereinafter provided for
their surviving issue per stirpes." Id. at 363, 384 S.E.2d at 594.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Rogers also prepared answers for the Copenhavers to use in the suit construing the
validity of the trust. Assuming these acts established an attorney-client relationship be-
tween Rogers and the Copenhavers, it was one independent of the relationship between
Rogers and the testator. As such, it could not provide the basis for finding that the
Copenhavers were in privity with Rogers with respect to the services he provided to the
testator. Id. at 365 n.1, 384 S.E.2d at 595 n.1.
56. Id. at 363-64, 384 S.E.2d at 594.
57. In addition to the lost remainder interest, the Copenhavers alleged the misdelivery of
a $250,000 check out of estate funds and negligent tax advice to Mr. Hull, who died in 1987.
The allegedly negligent tax advice increased the generation transfer skipping tax paid by
the estate by $1,600,000. The total damages claimed by the Copenhavers totalled $3,475,000.
Id.
58. Id. at 366, 384 S.E.2d at 595.
59. See id. at 367, 384 S.E.2d at 595-96. Justice Thomas apparently did not question that
the Copenhavers successfully pled the existence of a contract between Rogers and the Hulls.
"[T]he contract on which they rely is oral." Id. Additionally, the court assumed, without
deciding, that § 55-22 applied to oral contracts. Id. The essence of Justice Thomas' argu-
ment concerns the failure to allege that Rogers or the Hulls ever intended that anyone bene-
fit from the contract to write the will. See id.
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made under an "instrument" for the third party's benefit, "in whole or in
part.""0 The trial court did not determine whether oral contracts were
within the ambit of "instrument" in section 55-22.
Rogers filed a demurrer on grounds that the Copenhavers were not in
privity nor was their action one for which Virginia had enacted antipriv-
ity statutes."' The Copenhavers responded that privity was "irrelevant"
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-22 (Repl. Vol. 1986) provides:
An immediate estate or interest in or the benefit of a condition respecting any estate
may be taken by a person under an instrument, although he be not a party thereto;
and if a covenant or promise be made for the benefit, in whole or in part, of a person
with whom it is not made, or with whom it is made jointly with others, such person,
whether named in the instrument or not, may maintain in his own name any action
thereon which he might maintain in case it had been made with him only and the
consideration had moved from him to the party making such covenant or promise. In
such action the covenantor or promisor shall be permitted to make all defenses he
may have, not only against the covenantee or promisee, but against such beneficiary
as well.
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-22 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
Virginia should adopt the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981) ("Restate-
ment") position in third-party beneficiary suits against lawyers in the estate planning area.
A thorough discussion of whether § 55-22 does apply to oral contracts is beyond the scope of
this Note. The Restatement makes no reference to an "instrument," as in VA. CODE ANN. §
55-22.
The word "instrument" has been used since Virginia's earliest versions of § 55-22, but the
original intent does not appear to have been to bar third-party actions. See 33 Va. Code, ch.
116, § 2 (1849). In Thacker v. Hubard & Appelby, Inc., 122 Va. 379, 94 S.E. 929 (1918), the
court said, "[iun actions upon parol contracts, the rule is well established that the party may
sue thereon with whom the contract is made, or who is beneficially interested in it." Id. at
389, 94 S.E. at 931 (quoting Jones v. Thomas, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 96 (1871)). "Such was the
state of the law at the time of the revision of the general statutes of the state in 1849." Id.;
see Brief of Appellants at 29.
61. The Virginia General Assembly has twice spoken to the issue of privity:
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be~no defense in any action
brought against the manufacturer or seller of goods to recover damages for breach of
warranty, express or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did not
purchase the goods from the defendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom the manu-
facturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be affected by
the goods .... VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-813 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
In cases not provided for in § 8.2-318 where recovery of damages for injury to per-
son, including death, or to property resulting from negligence is sought, lack of priv-
ity shall be no defense.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-223 (Repl. Vol. 1984). It appears that an argument could be made that
the damages suffered by the loss of a testamentary gift comes within the scope of § 8.2-318,
especially a devise of real property or a bequest of personalty as opposed to financial assets.
Although the plaintiffs in Copenhaver alleged damages to their remainder interest, see
supra note 57, and a remainder interest is clearly within the definition of property, they
chose to proceed on a third-party beneficiary theory. However, as the trial court had denied
a tort-based recovery as well as a third-party beneficiary claim in its decision and the
Copenhavers had appealed the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court of Virginia consid-
ered the nature of the damages in its opinion. Stating that "this is a case involving a claim
solely for economic losses," the court held that the Copenhavers had "no cause of action
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as they were "third party beneficiaries of the wills and estate plans of
their grandparents." 2 Being described as "issue," the Copenhavers
needed to prove that they were members of a sufficiently definite class
"clearly intended as beneficiaries" of the oral contract to draft their
grandmother's will.6 3 The trial court held 1) the strict privity rule barred
an action in tort, and 2) it had not been shown that plaintiffs were
"clearly intended"" to be beneficiaries (i.e., they were not members of a
sufficiently designated class).6 5
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Copenhavers re-
sponded to the ruling of the trial court that they were adequately identi-
fied as the beneficiaries of the oral contract, and that section 55-22 of the
Code of Virginia covered such contracts. 6 The court assumed, without
deciding, that section 55-22 applied to oral contracts67 and did not reach
the issue of whether the Copenhavers were sufficiently identified to be
"clearly intended" beneficiaries.6 6 Instead, the court rested its ruling on a
failure to allege that there was any intent that the Copenhavers should
benefit from the oral contract between the attorney, Rogers, and the
*.. in tort against Rogers ... absent privity." Copenhaver, 238 Va. at 366, 384 S.E.2d at
595. Furthermore, Virginia strictly construes the statutes. Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling &
Neale, 236 Va. 419, 423, 374 S.E.2d 55, 57 (1988).
62. Copenhaver, 238 Va. at 365, 384 S.E.2d at 595.
63. Id. at 366, 384 S.E.2d at 595.
64. Virginia requires that in order to state a third-party beneficiary claim, it must be
alleged and proven that the parties to the contract clearly and definitely intended to confer
the benefit of the performance on the third party. See supra note 48.
65. The opinion in Copenhaver affirmed the trial court's demurrer "because the
Copenhavers left unanswered that portion of the trial court's ruling which stated that the
Copenhavers failed to allege that they 'were ... beneficiaries of the principal contract.'"
Copenhaver, 238 Va. at 367, 384 S.E.2d at 596. (emphasis added by the Supreme Court of
Virginia). It is submitted that the Supreme Court of Virginia misinterpreted the ruling of
the court below. The trial court opinion, in pertinent part, reads:
In reciting from the bench why this particular case did not present the court with a
classic third-party beneficiary claim as alleged by plaintiffs, the court observed that
for a recovery under any third-party beneficiary claim it must be alleged and shown
that the plaintiffs were clearly intended as beneficiaries of the principal contract. See
Professional Realty v. Bender, 216 Va. 737 (1976). In this case, no grandchildren were
designated by name and the bequest, at best, was intended for the benefit of a class
of persons not yet determined and for which there is no certainty whatsoever that the
plaintiffs would be included in that class.
Letter Opinion, Copenhaver v. Rogers (Va. Cir. Ct. of Smyth County, May 20, 1988).
In reading the actual ruling of the trial court, it becomes clear that the quoted portion
spoke to the issue of class definiteness, not whether the Copenhavers left unanswered any
portion of that ruling pertaining to failure to plead the existence of a contract made for
their benefit.
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-22 (Repl. Vol. 1986) is highly remedial and should be liberally
construed. Norfolk-Portsmouth Newspapers, Inc. v. Stott, 208 Va. 228, 156 S.E.2d 610
(1967); Montague Mfg. Co. v. Homes Corp., 142 Va. 301, 128 S.E. 447 (1926).
67. See supra notes 59-60.
68. Copenhaver, 238 Va. at 367, 384 S.E.2d at 596.
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testator.69
In several portions of their pleadings, the Copenhavers had referred to
themselves as the "intended beneficiaries of the estates" of their grand-
parents. ° The court differentiated the claim as pled from being the "in-
tended beneficiary of the contract" between Rogers and the Hulls to pre-
pare the will in question.7 1 Writing for the court, Justice Thomas stated
that "[tihere is a critical difference between being the intended benefi-
ciary of an estate and being the intended beneficiary of a contract be-
tween a lawyer and his client."7 2
The court's reasoning exposes the predicament that a non-client benefi-
ciary to a contract between a testator and a lawyer faces under the tradi-
tional third-party beneficiary analysis. In order to state a valid claim, the
litigant must allege that a contract existed which indicates the parties'
intent to give the third party the benefit of the performance. Even assum-
ing the application of oral contracts under section 55-22 of the Code of
Virginia, the litigants will be hard pressed to plead the facts sufficient to
prove that the arrangement that transpired in the lawyer's office rested
upon the lawyer's desire to confer any benefits upon them. Being desig-
nated in the will is not enough, as
the will is not the contract, but rather that which is contracted for. Further-
more, even if the naming of the legatee in the will is taken as indicating the
testator's intent to benefit the legatee, it cannot be taken to indicate that
the drafting attorney intended to confer any benefit. Thus it is very unlikely
that a beneficiary could ever bring suit under the ... [traditional]
requirements."1
Even if the Copenhavers had pled that they were the intended benefi-
ciaries of the contract of representation,7 4 under traditional analysis the
69. Id.
70. Id. at 368, 384 S.E.2d at 596.
71. Id.
72. Justice Thomas offered two examples to illustrate the difference between a beneficiary
of an estate and a beneficiary of a contract. One was where a client requests a lawyer's
services in preparing a will and does not care who gets what, as long as taxes are minimized.
In such a situation, to Justice Thomas, "none could fairly be described as beneficiaries of
the contract between the client and his attorney because the intent of the relationship was
to avoid taxes as much as possible." Id. at 368-69, 384 S.E.2d at 597. No party named in the
will could have an enforceable interest. In the second hypothetical, the client instructs the
lawyer that unless the lawyer can guarantee that each grandchild will get a million dollars,
he will take his legal business elsewhere. According to the court, this would make each
grandchild an intended beneficiary of the contract between the lawyer and the client. Id. at
369, 384 S.E.2d at 597.
73. Id. at 370, 384 S.E.2d at 598.
74. They in fact have filed a new action in the Circuit Court of the City of Roanoke
expressly pleading facts to prove they were intended third-party beneficiaries of the con-
tract of representation between the drafting attorney and the testators. Copenhaver v. Rog-
ers, Law No. CL-89001063 (Va. Cir. Ct. of Roanoke filed Nov. 8, 1989). They contend that
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determinative intent is that of the lawyer as the promisor. It is submitted
that the testator's intent in designating certain persons in a will ought to
govern the issue of incidental versus intended beneficiaries. Yet under the
traditional theory as espoused by the Supreme Court of Virginia, that
intent would define the lawyer's contractual obligation to benefit those
persons.
This is not a case of a mere technical flaw in pleading an established
theory in a novel fact situation. The nature of the attorney-client employ-
ment relationship in the drafting of testamentary instrument does not
lend itself to application under traditional means of third-party contract
beneficiary analysis. Only by torturing the reality of estate planning can
it be said that a lawyer ever personally promises to benefit those men-
tioned in a will which the lawyer drafts as a service for a client. 5
In considering this same dilemma, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
took a common sense, pro-active view that "persons who are named bene-
ficiaries under a will who lose their intended legacy due to the failure of
an attorney to properly draft the instrument should not be left without
recourse or remedy .... ,"7 Likewise in a case of first impression, the
court in Guy v. Liederbach" weighed its traditional third-party benefi-
ciary requirements against the approach taken in section 302 of the Sec-
ond Restatement of Contracts ("Restatement") .7 In Guy, a witness to a
the prior action, as originally filed in the Circuit Court of Smyth County and decided by the
Supreme Court of Virginia in Copenhaver v. Rogers, has no res judicata effect on the new
action because defendant's demurrer in the prior action did not specifically allege that
plaintiffs had failed to plead the facts necessary to support a third-party beneficiary cause
of action at law.
Plaintiffs cite to statutory authority for the proposition that "[n]o grounds other than
those stated specifically in the demurrer shall be considered by the court." VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-273 (A) (Repl. Vol. 1984). Accordingly, they argue that a ruling on the demurrer can
address only those grounds specifically raised, not all possible grounds for dismissal. De-
fendants contend that the prior action was a decision on the merits and that res judicata
bars the Roanoke action. See, e.g., Brunner v. Cook, 134 Va. 266, 272, 114 S.E. 650, 651
(1922).
The new action was scheduled for argument before the Circuit Court of the City of Roa-
noke as this publication went to press, in May 1990.
75. "A third-party beneficiary is one intended to be benefitted by an exchange between a
promisor and a promisee. It is a journey into artifice to say that an attorney scrivener of a
will makes any promise to benefit a legatee of a will he writes for another." Guy v.
Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, -, 459 A.2d 744, 754 (1983) (McDermott, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at -, 459 A.2d at 752.
77. Id. at -' 459 A.2d at 744.
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1979) states:
Intended and Incidental Beneficiaries
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between the promisor and the promisee, a beneficiary of
a promise is at intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the
beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to
pay money to the beneficiary; or
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will was also the named beneficiary. That act invalidated her legacy, and
even though she witnessed the will under the direction of the testator's
lawyer, no privity could exist between them because "he could not em-
ploy his expertise on her behalf in such a manner."" In considering her
third-party beneficiary claim under a traditional analysis, the plaintiff in
Guy would be met with the same obstacles as in Copenhaver.s° Persuaded
that the Restatement's interpretation provided a "properly restricted
cause of action,""1 the court overruled its traditional analysis for third-
party beneficiary claims of this nature.
8 2
Under the Restatement 302, a beneficiary must first establish standing
to sue by pleading facts which show that the recognition of a right to
performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention
of the parties.8 3 This "appropriateness" standard grants the trial court
considerable room for the exercise of discretion. 4 In accepting employ-
ment to draft a legally enforceable will, it is submitted that the trial court
could be well within its discretion to find that the paramount purpose in
designating beneficiaries is that they receive the gift benefits described in
the will.8 5 Logically, the parties do not contract for an invalid will. More-
over, as the executor or trustee cannot sue the drafting attorney for the
failure of a testamentary gift,8 granting the beneficiary standing to en-
force the lawyer's performance to write a valid testamentary distribution
is "appropriate." If the beneficiary cannot enforce it, no one can.
Whereas the traditional analysis depends upon allegations that the law-
yer, as promisor, intended to confer benefits upon the designated parties
in a will, the Restatement position is that once standing is recognized as
appropriate in the beneficiary, he or she is an intended beneficiary if the
circumstances indicate that the testator (promisee) intended to give the
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary
the benefit of the promised performance.
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended
beneficiary.
It should be noted that under § 302, it is the intention of the promisee that defines the
right of the beneficiary. Hence, unlike the artificial situation where the lawyer is deemed the
promisor, conferring the benefits of his client's estate upon the beneficiary, the intent of the
testator-client determines who is the intended beneficiary. It is submitted that this ap-
proach better describes the reality of the attorney-client relationship in contracting for the
attorney's services to prepare a will.
79. 501 Pa. at -' 459 A.2d at 751.
80. See id. at -, 459 A.2d at 750-51.
81. Id. at __, 459 A.2d at 751.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at __, 459 A.2d at 751.
85. See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, -, 364 P.2d 685, 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824
(1961); Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St. 3d 74, -, 512 N.E.2d 636, 639 (1987)(Brown, J.,
dissenting).
86. See supra notes 19 & 35.
428 [Vol. 24:415
1990] CONTRACT TO PREPARE A WILL 429
benefits of the performance to the beneficiary. 87 Again, as the testator
contracts for a legally valid will, the circumstances surrounding the ar-
rangement with the lawyer to write the will indicate that the testator be-
lieved the will would properly dispose of the property in question to the
benefit of designated beneficiaries.8 8
In Hale v. Groce,8' 9 the intended beneficiary sued the drafting attorney
for failing to follow the client's direction to include a testamentary gift in
the will or in a relate d trust.9 0 Persuaded that this case presented not
only a "plausible," but a "classic" example of the Second Restatement of
Contracts definition of the third-party beneficiary, a unanimous Oregon
Supreme Court followed the Pennsylvania court in Guy and the Connect-
icut court in Stowe v. Smith9 1 by adopting the Restatement in the estate
planning setting.
The Supreme Court of Virginia considered Guy but was "unwilling" to
modify its third-party beneficiary position based on the Copenhavers'
claim. The court called that claim "plainly inadequate," 92 but where does
that inadequacy lie? Even assuming that section 55-22 applies to oral
contracts,9 3 and the statute is "highly remedial," 94 under traditional
third-party analysis, litigants and courts will have to make-believe that
when an attorney prepares a client's will, he or she makes a direct prom-
ise to benefit those who the client intends to benefit.
V. CONCLUSION
In deciding its first case on the subject, Virginia has presented the
bench and bar with an unworkable "remedy" for third-party beneficiary
claims against lawyers for the negligent preparation of testamentary in-
87. Guy, 501 Pa. at -, 459 A.2d at 751-52.
88. As the court in Guy stated:
In the case of a testator-attorney contract, the attorney is the promisor, promising to
draft a will which carries out the testator's intention to benefit the legatees. The tes-
tator is the promisee, who intends that the name beneficiaries have the benefit of the
attorney's promised performance. The circumstances which clearly indicate the testa-
tor's intent to benefit a named legatee are his arrangements with the attorney and the
text of his will.
Guy, 501 Pa. at -, 459 A.2d at 752.
89. 304 Or. 281, 744 P.2d 1289 (1987).
90. Id. at -, 744 P.2d at 1290.
91. 184 Conn. 194, 441 A.2d 81 (1981). Stowe also recognized a cause of action based on
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 in a case involving a beneficiary under a will
suing for legal malpractice. 184 Conn. at -, 441 A.2d at 83.
92. Copenhaver v. Rogers, 238 Va. 361, 371, 384 S.E.2d 593, 598 (1989).
93. Id; see supra notes 59-60.
94. Id. at 371, 384 S.E.2d at 598. Norfolk-Portsmouth Newspapers, Inc. v. Stott, 208 Va.
228, 156 S.E.2d 610 (1967); Montague Mfg. Co. v. Homes Corp., 142 Va. 301, 128 S.E. 447
(1925).
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struments. Barred in tort by rigid adherence to strict privity, persons
who, but for attorney error, are intended to benefit under any will drafted
in the Commonwealth will have to allege and prove a legal fiction that it
is the attorney, and not the testator, who intended to benefit them. A
more equitable approach would be to admit the reality of the situation
and implement a means to achieve its objectives. Recognizing that the
third-party beneficiaries are the testator's beneficiaries, and not the attor-
ney's, seems to be the logical solution.
Brian Adams
